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A. Sterilization by Private Physician Does Not Constitute State
Action
For almost a century, I the federal courts have recognized that the provi-
sions of the equal protection and due process clauses of the fourteenth
amehdment 2 and of the civil rights legislation 3 enacted thereunder applied
only to state action and did not prohibit "[i]ndividual invasion of individ-
ual rights."4 The dichotomy between private actions and actions of the
state has become the focus of civil rights litigation during the past decade
as courts have attempted to develop criteria for determining whether activ-
ity is private or state inspired.5 While the Supreme Court initially adopted
a very broad test for determining whether state action existed,6 recent
decisions by the Court have limited the circumstances in which a finding
of state action is justified.7 In the majority of recent cases, courts have
I The Supreme Court first noted the necessity of finding state action in suits brought
under the fourteenth amendment in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
2 The fourteenth amendment provides in relevant part: "[n]o state shall ...deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
The section of the civil rights law which is most frequently the subject of litigation is
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) which provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
Governmental involvement which rises to a level sufficient to establish state action for consti-
tutional purposes is also sufficient to establish that the actions of private institutions were
performed under color of state law for the purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). United States
v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n.7 (1966); Doe v. Charleston Area Medical Center, Inc., 529 F.2d
638, 642 n.6 (4th Cir. 1975) (citing cases).
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883).
See, e.g., Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974); Moose Lodge No.
107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
See generally Note, State Action: Theories for Applying Constitutional Restrictions to Private
Activity, 74 CoLuM. L. REv. 656 (1974); Comment, State Action After Jackson v. Metropolitan
Edison Co.: Analytical Framework for a Restrictive Doctrine, 81 DICK. L. REv. 315 (1977);
The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1, 139 (1975).
' The attempt to develop criteria for distinguishing between state and private activity
began with Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961). In Burton, the Court
indicated that the sum total of all governmental connections with the ostensibly private
entity were to be considered and noted that "[o]nly by sifting facts and weighing circum-
stances can the nonobvious involvement of the State in private conduct be attributed its true
significance." Id. at 722..State action was demonstrated under Burton if a symbiotic relation-
ship existed between the state and the private entity making the actions of one the actions
of the other. Id. at 725.
' While Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961), is viewed generally
as adopting a broad approach concentrating on the totality of state involvement and search-
ing for a symbiotic relationship between the private institution and the state activity, recent
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required a showing that a close nexus exists between the state involvement
and the challenged activity of the private entity sufficient to make the
activity of the private entity that of the state itself.8 Nevertheless, most
courts have been willing to look to the overall relationship between the
state and the private entity if the injury is alleged to be the result of racial
discrimination.?
The Fourth Circuit, however, has not limited itself to a close nexus
analysis, adopting instead the overall relationship test.'0 Furthermore, the
Fourth Circuit has not limited application of the overall relationship test
to cases involving alleged racial discrimination." In fact, the Fourth Cir-
decisions by the Court emphasize the necessity of finding a nexus between the state involve-
ment and the private activity which caused the injury. For example, in Moose Lodge No. 107
v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972), the Court held that the issuance of a liquor license by the state
to a private, all-white club was insufficient to involve the state in the act of discrimination,
because the state activity of issuing the license was not connected with the private activity
which led to the discrimination. Id. at 175-77. The Irvis Court noted that the club served no
public function and that the license was the only governmental contact. Id. at 171, 175-78.
While Irvis usually is cited as requiring a showing of nexus between the state activity and
the resulting injury, see, e.g., Cannon v. University of Chicago, 559 F.2d 1063, 1068 (7th Cir.
1976), the Court noted that the facts in Irvis did not support a finding of state action based
on the symbiotic relationship existing between the state and the private institution. 407 U.S.
at 175. Thus, Irvis properly may be viewed as accepting either a "close nexus" or an "overall
relationship" analysis. Braden v. University of Pittsburgh, 552 F.2d 948, 958 n.46 (3d Cir.
1977) (en banc).
The Court indicated a further desire to limit the analysis applied in state action cases
to the close nexus analysis in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974). In
Jackson, the Court noted that the fact that private activity was subject to state regulation,
provided an essential public service, or occupied a monopoly position did not by themselves
convert the actions of the private entity into state action. Id. at 350-59. Rather, the Court
maintained that "the inquiry must be whether there is a sufficiently close nexus between the
State and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of the latter may
be fairly treated as that of the State itself." Id. at 351. Though the Jackson Court held that
a sufficiently close nexus did not exist on the facts of Jackson, the Court noted that a
symbiotic relatinship between the state and the private entity was also absent. Id. at 357.
Nevertheless, the Court intimated that the symbiotic relationship analysis should be limited
to application where the facts involved a lessee of public property. Id. at 358.
E.g., Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974); Schlein v. Milford
Hosp., Inc., 561 F.2d 427, 429 (2d Cir. 1977); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 559 F.2d 1063,
1069 (7th Cir. 1976); Ascherman v. Presbyterian Hosp. of Pacific Medical Center, Inc., 507
F.2d 1103 (9th Cir. 1974); Ward v. St. Anthony Hosp., 476 F.2d 671 (10th Cir. 1973). The
close nexus test was stated cogently by the Second Circuit in asserting that "the state must
be involved not simply with some activity of the institution . . . but with the activity that
caused the injury." Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73, 81 (2d Cir. 1968).
See, e.g., Schlein v. Milford Hosp., Inc., 561 F.2d 427, 428 n.5 (2d Cir. 1977); Eaton v.
Grubbs, 329 F.2d 710 (4th Cir. 1964); Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d
959 (4th Cir. 1963). But see Cannon v. University of Chicago, 559 F.2d 1063, 1071 (7th Cir.
1976) (nexus requirement must be satisfied in cases involving racial discrimination under
!rvis).
I" E.g., Christhilfv. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Ass'n, Inc., 496 F.2d 174 (4th Cir. 1974);
Sams v. Ohio Valley Gen. Hosp. Ass'n., 413 F.2d 826 (4th Cir. 1969); Simkins v. Moses H.
Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959, 967 (4th Cir. 1963).
" Sams v. Ohio Valley Gen. Hosp. Ass'n., 413 F.2d 826, 828 (4th Cir. 1969). In Sams,
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cuit has been willing to find government involvement sufficient to consti-
tute state action simply upon a showing that the private institution has
received some form of federal, state or municipal funding. 2 The Fourth
Circuit also has been persuaded that state action exists where the private
entity receives special tax treatment, 13 has been granted the power of emi-
nent domain and has exercised that power," or is the subject of extensive
state or federal regulation." While the court has noted frequently that few
of these circumstances would constitute state action by themselves,"6 the
court has shown a willingness to view the state's involvement from the
perspective of the totality of circumstances and to inquire whether the
state, through its involvement, has placed its power, property and prestige
behind the private conduct.
In Doe v. Charleston Area Medical Center, Inc.," the Fourth Circuit
acknowledged that it occupied a minority position among the circuits with
respect to its willingness to find state action solely on the basis of the
receipt of federal funds, but the court was reluctant to reconsider its prior
decisions 8 because of a finding that the state was directly involved in the
specific hospital policy under attack. 9 Thus, the Fourth Circuit found a
consideration of the overall relationship between the state and the private
the court stated that "[wihile no race considerations exist here as were present in [our
previous] decisions . . ., the constitutional principles [with respect to state action] there
announced apply in full strength to the non-racial issues of this case." Id.
12 Doe v. Charleston Area Medical Center, Inc., 529 F.2d 638 (4th Cir. 1975) (federal Hill-
Burton construction funds and Medicaid/Medicare funds); Christhilf v. Annapolis Emer-
gency Hosp. Ass'n., Inc., 496 F.2d 174, 178 (4th Cir. 1974) (federal Hill-Burton construction
funds and county capital expenditure funding); Eaton v. Grubbs, 329 F.2d 710 (4th Cir. 1964)
(state and federal capital constructi6n subsidies).
The funding most frequently deemed sufficient to establish state action is the federal
Hill-Burton construction program. 42 U.S.C. §§ 292-292j (1970 & Supp. V 1975). As the
Fourth Circuit noted in Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir.
1963):
Participation in the Hill-Burton program subjects hospitals to an elaborate and
intricate pattern of governmental regulation, both state and Federal ....
[U]pon joining the program a participating State in effect assumes, as a State
function, the obligation of planning for adequate hospital care. And it is, of course,
clear that when a State function or responsibility is being exercised, it matters not
for Fourteenth Amendment purposes that the ... [institution actually chosen to
meet this State function] ... would otherwise be private ....
Id. at 964, 968.
" Eaton v. Grubbs, 329 F.2d 710, 713 (4th Cir. 1964).
" Id.
" Doe v. Charleston Area Medical Center, Inc., 529 F.2d 638, 643 (4th Cir. 1975).
" E.g., Eaton v. Grubbs, 329 F.2d 710 (4th Cir. 1964).
529 F.2d 638 (4th Cir. 1975).
' In fact, the Fourth Circuit reiterated its adherence to its prior decisions. Id. at 642.
" Id. at 643. The lower court in Charleston Area Medical Center made a specific finding,
adopted by the Fourth Circuit, that the hospital's policy of refusing all but therapeutic
abortions was based in part upon West Virginia's criminal abortion statute which prohibited
non-therapeutic abortions. Id.
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entity unnecessary since the plaintiff had demonstrated a close nexus be-
tween the state policy and the private activity.
2
The opinion in Charleston Area Medical Center, Inc. indicated that the
Fourth Circuit was willing to reconsider its position with respect to finding
state action if the proper facts were presented. Recently, such a factual
situation was presented to the Fourth Circuit in Walker v. Pierce.21 Walker
involved a suit by two black females against their obstetrician alleging that
he had violated their civil rights by sterilizing them or threatening to
sterilize them, solely because of their race and number of children, while
they were receiving medical assistance under the Medicaid program.2 2 The
jury found against one of the women and assessed damages in favor of the
other woman in the amount of five dollars.Y Plaintiffs contended that the
physician imposed his personal economic philosophy on the plaintiffs, re-
quiring all Medicaid recipients who were delivering a third living child to
consent to sterilization and that this philosophy was effectuated under
color of state law through the Medicaid program administered by the
state.24
The Fourth Circuit held that the obstetrician's conduct was private and
that there was insufficient state involvement in his conduct to warrant a
finding of state action.25 The court maintained that since the prevailing
plaintiff's doctor's fees were paid by a private insurer and not by Medicaid,
there was no governmental involvement in the activity which led to the
injury.2' Finally, the Fourth Circuit noted that mere receipt of Hill-Burton
SId.
2' 560 F.2d 609 (4th Cir. 1977).
Id. at 610.
Id. at 611.
21 Id. The doctor testified that his policy of requiring sterilization was not limited to
recipients of Medicaid, but also was imposed on any woman who was unable to pay her own
bills. Of the two plaintiffs in Walker, the doctor's bills of the plaintiff who prevailed against
the obstetrician were paid by her employer's insurer. Only her hospital bills were paid by
Medicaid. Id. at 612. All of the medical bills of the plaintiff against whom the jury found
were paid by Medicaid. Id. at 611.
Id. at 613.
26 Id. The Walker court also noted that the prevailing plaintiff was not sterilized. Rather,
the plaintiff's only alleged injury was that she was discharged prematurely from the hospital.
The Fourth Circuit found that accepted procedure was followed. Id.
I Id. The Fourth Circuit cited Ascherman v. Presbyterian Hosp., 507 F.2d 1103, 1105
(9th Cir. 1974), as supporting the proposition that receipt of Hill-Burton funds will not
convert private conduct into state action. Ascherman, however, is directly contrary to prior
Fourth Circuit authority. Ascherman involved a suit by a doctor who had been denied staff
privileges by the defendant hospital. The doctor alleged that the denial of staff privileges was
state action and asserted that the state action was evidenced by the receipt of Hill-Burton
funds and federal and state tax exemptions. Id. at 1104. The Ninth Circuit specifically
rejected Fourth Circuit precedent which held that receipt of Hill-Burton funds was sufficient
to support a finding of state action. Id. The Ascherman court held that the mere receipt of
Hill-Burton funds is not a sufficient connection between the state and the private activity of
which the plaintiff complained to constitute state action and held that there must be a close
nexus between the state activity and the private conduct. Id. at 1105. Ascherman, unlike
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funds by a hospital would not convert the obstetrician's conduct into state
action.1 While the Walker court properly noted that a physician does not
act under color of state law simply by practicing in an institution which
receives federal funds, the opinion neither elaborates on the rationale for
such a determination nor cites controlling authority.2 The receipt of fed-
eral funds by the hospital in which the physician practices neither demon-
strates a symbiotic relationship between the state and the physician suffi-
cient to support a finding that the actions of the latter constituted the
actions of the former29 nor demonstrates a close nexus between the state
funding and the challenged conduct of the physician.2 0
The Walker dissent argued that the obstetrician's role as a Medicaid
administrator was sufficient to make his actions state inspired.3' The dis-
sent first distinguished between the obstetrician's professional role as a
physician treating Medicaid patients and his role as an administrator of
the fiscal and administrative aspects of the Medicaid program. 2 When a
physician directs the performance of medical services based on the health
needs of the patient, the dissent contended, the physician's actions are not
under color of state law, but rather reflect the performance of professional
duties uninfluenced by government policies.3 3 Where the physician's con-
duct is the result of economic considerations rather than the health needs
of his patients, however, the dissent asserted that an inquiry into whether
the physician's activities constituted state action was justified .3 The dis-
sent concluded that because the obstetrician in Walker was motivated by
his personal economic philosophy rather than the health needs of his pa-
tient and because the obstetrician was the patient's sole contact with the
state funded program, a finding of state action was warranted. 5
While the Walker dissent appears to base its conclusion on a finding of
Walker, did not involve the conduct of a doctor, performed in a hospital which received
federal funding, but involved the activity of the hospital itself. Ascherman is distingtiishable
from Walker on that basis. If the Walker court was inclined to reverse Fourth Circuit prece-
dent contrary to Ascherman, the court should have confronted that precedent rather than
ignoring it. Nevertheless, Fourth Circuit precedent would not have required a contrary result
in Walker since the precedent involved finding state action with respect to the hospital's
activities on the basis of funds received by the hospital rather than with respect to a doctor
who did not receive federal funds but practiced in such a hospital. See text accompanying
notes 10-20 supra.
21 See note 27 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 6 and 16 supra.
30 See text accompanying note 7 supra.
:' 560 F.2d at 615 (Butzner, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
Id. at 614.
Id., citing Byrne v. Kyser, 347 F.2d 734 (7th Cir. 1965).
2' 560 F.2d at 614.
Id. at 615. The Walker dissent maintained that the obstetrician had assumed a state
function in that he was the sole contact between the state and the patient. The dissent found
that the obstetrician handled all paperwork and the majority of the administrative responsi-
bility for the operation of the program. Id. Finally, the dissent noted that the obstetrician
received approximately $60,000 from the Medicaid program during the period in which the
alleged injuries occurred. Id.
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a symbiotic relationship between the obstetrician and the state, the dissent
made no finding of any nexus between the obstetrician's policies and the
state funding. The Medicaid officials neither encouraged nor condoned the
obstetrician's conduct." The Walker dissent's position, while consistent
with precedent in the Fourth Circuit,37 ignores the current trend toward
requiring a finding of a close nexus between the state involvement and the
challenged activity.38 Nevertheless, the Walker majority fails to confront
the long line of Fourth Circuit precedent opposing its approach in this area.
Walker could represent the beginning of a shift from the broad analysis
previously applied by the Fourth Circuit. If so, future litigants will no
longer be able to depend on a showing of state funding to warrant a finding
of state action. Rather future litigants should allege and prove facts suffi-
cient to show a pervasive state role in every aspect of the private entity's
affairs or allege and prove facts demonstrating a direct relationship be-
tween the state's involvement and the challenged activity.
B. Equal Pay Provisions Do Not Violate State Sovereignty
In National League of Cities v. Usery, 1 the Supreme Court resurrected
the tenth amendment2 concept of state sovereignty as an affirmative limi-
Upon learning of the obstetrician's policies, the state administrator for the Medicaid
program sought a statement from the obstetrician stating that he would no longer impose
sterilization requirements on Medicaid patients or discriminate against them. Upon learning
of the obstetrician's refusal to sign such a statement, the state administrator imposed a non-
payment sanction on all of his submitted Medicaid bills. Id. at 612.
17 See text accompanying notes 10-20 supra.
I The district court for the Western District of Virginia recently noted that existing
Fourth Circuit precedent in the state action area appeared tenuous in light of recent Supreme
Court decisions. Large v. Reynolds, 414 F. Supp. 45, 46 (W.D. Va. 1976). As noted previously,
see text accompanying notes 17-20 supra, the Fourth Circuit itself appears increasingly reluc-
tant to find state action solely on the basis of receipt of public funds unconnected with the
alleged injury. See Doe v. Charleston Area Medical Center, Inc., 529 F.2d 638 (4th Cir. 1975).
I 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
U.S. CONST. amend. X, states that "[tihe powers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively,
or to the people."
In United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), the Supreme Court declared that the
amendment was merely a "truism" and provided no substantive limitation of federal author-
ity. Id. at 124. After the Darby decision, the tenth amendment was regarded simply as a
statement of the relationship between national and state governments as it had been estab-
lished by the Constitution. See, e.g., Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L.
REv. 1 (1950); Cowen, Wat Is Left of the Tenth Amendment?, 39 N.C. L. REv. 154 (1961).
The League of Cities decision, however, resurrected the concept of structural federalism
embodied in the tenth amendment as a proscription of delegated federal authority. See
generally Matsumoto, National League of Cities - From Footnote to Holding - State Im-
munity from Commerce Clause Regulation, 1977 ARiz. ST. L.J. 35; Michelman, States' Rights
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tation on commerce clause authority.3 The League of Cities Court held that
congressional action extending the minimum wage and maximum hour
provisions4 of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)5 to virtually all non-
supervisory and non-elected personnel of state and local governments im-
permissibly operated "to directly displace the States' freedom to structure
integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions ... ."6
Because the League of Cities decision applied only to the wage and hour
provisions of FLSA, questions as to the validity of other provisions of that
statute -remained unanswered.
Shortly after the Court announced the League of Cities decision, many
states and their subdivisions moved to clarify some of the uncertainty
engendered by that opinion by challenging the equal pay provisions of the
FLSA under the tenth amendment.7 Congress had enacted the Equal Pay
Act' in 1963 as an amendment to the FLSA to prohibit sex-based wage
discrimination.' When subsequent amendments extended the FLSA provi-
and States' Roles: Permutations of "Sovereignty" in National League of Cities v. Usery, 86
YALE L.J. 1165 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Michelman]; Tribe, Unraveling National League
of Cities: The New Federalism and Affirmative Rights to Essential Government Services, 90
HARV. L. REv. 1065 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Tribe]; Note, Emerging Concepts of Federal-
ism: Limitations on the Spending Power and National Health Planning, 34 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 1133, 1138-55 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Federalism Limitations].
3 426 U.S. at 852. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, states that "Congress shall have Power
To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the
common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; .
29 U.S.C. §§ 206-207 (1970) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§-206-207 (1970 & Supp. V
1975)).
s Id. §§ 201-219 (1970 & Supp. V 1975) (originally enacted as Fair Labor Standards Act
of 1938, Pub. L. No. 718, ch. 678, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938)).
6 426 U.S. at 852. In League of Cities, the appellants challenged the application of
minimum wage and maximum hour requirements to state and local government employment.
Id. at 839. Under the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601, §
102(b), 80 Stat. 830 (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(d), 203(x) (1970)), and 1974, Pub.
L. No. 93-259, § 6(a)(1), 88 Stat. 55 (current version of relevant portions codified at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 203(d), 203(x) (Supp. V 1975)). The Supreme Court previously had upheld the extension
of the minimum wage and maximum hour provisions to the employees of state-operated
hospitals and schools as a valid exercise of commerce clause authority. Maryland v. Wirtz,
392 U.S. 183, 188-99 (1968). The League of Cities Court, however, overruled Wirtz, see 426
U.S. at 855, and held that the tenth amendment protects functions essential to a state's
separate and independent existence from congressional interference under the commerce
clause. Id. at 852.
7 The application of the Equal Pay Act to state and local employment has been chal-
lenged as a violation of state sovereignty in at least thirty-six cases since the decision in
National League of Cities v. Usery. See, e.g., Usery v. Allegheny Cty. Institution Dist., 544
F.2d 148 (1976); Nilsen v. Metropolitan Fair and Exposition Auth., 435 F. Supp. 1159 (N.D.
11. 1977); Usery v. County of Oakland, 81 Lab. Cas. 47,847 (E.D. Mich. 1977) and cases cited
therein; Usery v. Edward J. Meyer Memorial Hosp., 428 F. Supp. 1368 (W.D.N.Y. 1977).
1 Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)
(1970)).
1 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) provides:
No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this section shall dis-
criminate, within any establishment in which such employees are employed, be-
1978]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
sions to states and localities,"° the equal pay amendments naturally also
were extended. Thus, the Equal Pay Act seemed as vulnerable to a state
sovereignty claim as the wage and hour provisions struck down in League
of Cities."
The Fourth Circuit, however, recently considered a tenth amendment
challenge to the equal pay provisions of the FLSA in Usery v. Charleston
County School District, ' and held that those provisions are beyond claims
of sovereign state immunity. 3 Because Congress expressly had based the
Equal Pay Act on a commerce clause foundation, 4 the school district and
the superintendent of schools contended that extending the equal pay
coverage to the states was invalid as an impermissible limitation of state
conduct under League of Cities.1 Furthermore, these appellants argued
that the Equal Pay Act no longer controlled their actions because the
application of the Act's requirements to states and localities was depen-
dent upon the definitions of "employer" and "employee" contained in the
FLSA amendments that were declared invalid by the League of Cities
Court."
Although Congress had intended the equal pay provisions to rest upon
a commerce clause base, 7 the Fourth Circuit did not consider that deter-
mination binding upon courts that must rule on the constitutionality of the
act's requirements." According to the court in Charleston County, the
question was not whether Congress correctly surmised the source of its
powers when enacting the legislation, but whether Congress had any au-
thority at all to adopt the Act.0 In resolving that question, the Fourth
tween employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees in such establish-
ment at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of the
opposite sex in such establishment for equal work on jobs the performance of which
requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under simi-
lar working conditions, except where such payment is made pursuant to (i) a senior-
ity system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity
or quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than
sex: Provided, That an employer who is paying a wage rate differential in violation
of this subsection shall not, in order to comply with the provisions of this subsec-
tion, reduce the wage rate of any employee.
10 See note 6 supra.
" See generally Comment, Applying the Equal Pay Act to State and Local Governments:
The Effect of National League of Cities v. Usery, 125 U. PA. L. Rv. 665 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Equal Pay Act].
12 558 F.2d 1169 (4th Cir. 1977).
'3 Id. at 1172.
" Section 2(b) of the Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56, states:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of this Act, through exercise by Congress of
its power to regulate commerce among the several States and with foreign nations,
to correct the conditions above referred to in. . .industries [engaged in commerce
or the production of goods for commerce.]
" 558 F.2d at 1171.
I !d.
'7 See note 14 supra.




Circuit emphasized the anti-discrimination character of the measure and
concluded that the Equal Pay Act "may be viewed as an exercise of Con-
gress' power to adopt legislation enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment's
guarantee of equal protection of the law."2 Because the fourteenth amend-
ment, unlike the commerce clause, was directed expressly to the states,2
the court found no basis for the contention that the tenth amendment
proscribed application of the equal pay amendments to the states.
2
2
Since the equal pay provisions could be upheld under the fourteenth
amendment, and therefore had a source of constitutional support distinct
from the commerce clause basis of other FLSA requirements, the Fourth
Circuit rejected appellants' assertions that the definitions contained in the
amendments struck down in League of Cities also were invalid as applied
to the Equal Pay Act.? The court indicated that although the definitions
"may not constitutionally be used to subject states and their subdivisions
to the FLSA's minimum wage and overtime provisions, they remain the
relevant cross-references for purposes of the Equal Pay Act. ' 24 Noting that
Congress added the Equal Pay Act to the FLSA "only for administrative
convenience and economy" rather than an intent to link the two statutes
substantively, the Fourth Circuit emphasized that the broad separability
clause of the FLSA, which assures the independent validity of each provi-
sion of the Act,2 1 reinforced the Equal Pay Act's character as a distinct
statute.'
21 Id. at 1170.
21 U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1, states in part that:
[N]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
See generally Frank & Munro, The Original Understanding of "Equal Protection of the
Laws," 50 COLUM. L. REv. 131 (1950); Goldstein, Death and Transfiguration of the State
Action Doctrine - Moose Lodge v. Irvis to Runyon v. McCrary, 1977 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q.
1.
' 558 F.2d at 1171.
23 Id. See note 6 supra.
2' 558 F.2d at 1171. At least two federal courts have rejected the severability argument,
however, and held that the League of Cities nullification of the FLSA amendments applied
to the Equal Pay Act as well. See Usery v. Owensboro-Daviess Cty. Hosp., 423 F. Supp. 843,
845 (W.D. Ky. 1976); Howard v. Ward Cty., 418 F. Supp. 494, 501 (D.N.D. 1976).
2 558 F.2d at 1171.
26 29 U.S.C. § 219 (1970) provides: "If any provision of this chapter or the application of
such provision to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter
and the application of such provision to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected
thereby."
2 558 F.2d at 1172. See also Usery v. Allegheny Cty. Institution Dist., 544 F.2d 148, 155
(3rd Cir. 1976); Usery v. County of Oakland, 81 Lab. Cas. 47,847 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
In Electric Bond & Share Co. v. SEC, 303 U.S. 419 (1938), the Supreme Court held that
the separability clause contained in the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, Pub.
L. No. 333, ch. 687, 49 Stat. 803 (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 79z-6 (1976)), required that
each provision of that statute be treated as an independent enactment. Referring to the
separability clause, the Court stated that
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By premising its ruling on the fourteenth amendment, the Fourth Cir-
cuit obviated the decision of the Equal Pay Act's validity under the com-
merce clause." In League of Cities, the Supreme Court had declared the
FLSA's wage and hour requirements impermissible as applied to the states
because they exceeded Congress' commerce clause power. 29 The League of
Cities Court, however, specifically refrained from deciding whether the
tenth amendment would limit congressional attempts to affect integral
operations of state government by exercising authority granted Congress
Congress has thus said that the statute is not an integrated whole, which as such
must be sustained or held invalid. On the contrary; when validity is in question,
divisibility and not integration is the guiding principle. Invalid parts are to be
excised and the remainder enforced.
303 U.S. at 434. The separability clause in question in Electric Bond is virtually identical to
the clause enforced by the Fourth Circuit in Charleston County. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 79z-6
(1976) with 29 U.S.C. § 219 (1970).
11 The Fourth Circuit declined to discuss the validity of the Equal Pay Act under either
the commerce or spending powers because the Act could be sustained without reference to
those powers. 558 F.2d at 1170 n.9. Other federal courts have not been as reluctant as the
Fourth Circuit, however, and have sustained the Equal Pay Act under the commerce clause
as well as the fourteenth amendment. See note 29 infra.
" 426 U.S. at 851-52. Although the import of League of Cities clearly is the revival of
the tenth amendment as an affirmative limitation on commerce clause authority, the Court's
endorsement of the implicit structural limitations of the federal system does not clearly define
a standard by which the limitation can be measured. Two possible tests have emerged - a
balancing test and an essential function test. See Federalism Limitations, supra note 2, at
1149-52.
Under the essential function test, a core area of important governmental activities that
traditionally have been performed by a state are isolated from congressional intervention
under the commerce clause. Any activity classified as one of these essential functions is
completely beyond the ambit of commerce clause legislation. See Equal Pay Act, supra note
11, at 672-76. An alternative interpretation of League of Cities, however, regards the Court
as following a more flexible balancing approach. Under this rationale, the court would weigh
the relative significance of the federal interest and of the state interest to be restricted. The
more likely the state interest could be characterized as an essential function, the more likely
that interest would prevail. See Federalism Limitations, supra note 2, at 1150-52. See also
Note, Toward New Safeguards on Conditional Spending: Implications of National League of
Cities v. Usery, 26 AMER. U.L. REV. 726, 727-31 (1977). Judicial balancing of such conflicting
interests has been criticized, however, as an attempt by courts to "perform a surrogate legis-
lative function." Fox, Federal Public Sector Labor Relations Legislation: The Aftermath of
National League of Cities v. Usery, 26 U. KAN. L. REv. 105, 113 (1977).
The Equal Pay Act has been upheld as a valid exercise of the commerce power under
both the essential function test and the balancing test. For an application of the essential
function theory, see Usery v. Bettendorf Community School Dist., 423 F. Supp. 637 (S.D.
Iowa 1976); Christensen v. Iowa, 417 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Iowa 1976). For an application of
the balancing test, see Marshall v. Board of Education of Milford, 14 Emp. Prac. Dec. 5785
(D. Conn. 1977). A similar analysis has been employed in cases considering the validity of
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Pub. L. No. 93-259, 88 Stat. 74, current version
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). See, e.g., Usery v. Board of Education of
Salt Lake City, 421 F. Supp. 718 (D. Utah 1976).
One commentator has asserted, however, that the Equal Pay Act cannot stand as com-
merce clause legislation because the wage reduction proviso, see note 9 supra, increases the
cost of dispensing state services in a manner similar to the minimum wage and overtime
provision declared invalid in League of Cities. See Equal Pay Act, supra note 11, at 671-72.
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under the enforcement clause of the fourteenth amendment." Because
congressional recitations of authority are not binding upon the judiciary,3'
the Fourth Circuit was free to determine the constitutionality of the Equal
Pay Act under the fourteenth amendment without being constrained by
the League of Cities commerce clause rationale.
Since the fourteenth amendment is designed to secure the rights of
individuals, 2 the crucial question for the court in Charleston County
School District was whether Congress was acting to further individual
rights protected by the fourteenth amendment when it enacted the Equal
Pay Act.3 If the congressional goal was to protect such a right, the fact that
Congress had characterized the Act as commerce clause legislation would
be irrelevant. An examination of the equal pay provisions reveals that their
purpose is to guarantee all persons equal treatment in employment by
prohibiting sex-based wage differentials." Anti-discrimination measures
such as this traditionally have been based on the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment. The Fourth Circuit thus concluded that,
although Congress had characterized the Equal Pay Act as commerce
clause legislation, the measure clearly was intended to be an anti-
discrimination statute." As such, the Act was a valid exercise of congres-
sional power under the enforcement clause of the fourteenth amendment.37
Even though the Charleston County court justifiably concluded that
the equal pay provisions could be construed as a fourteenth amendment
enactment, the constitutionality of the provisions as applied to the states
hinged upon the validity of the appellants' assertion that they infringed
the sovereignty of South Carolina. The sovereignty claim, however, is not
as persuasive in a fourteenth amendment context as it was in the com-
merce clause setting. In League of Cities, the Supreme Court resolved the
sovereignty issue by balancing the relevant federal and state interests con-
cerned.39 Such a resolution is unnecessary, however, when the interest
' See 426 U.S. at 852 n.17.
3, A conventional principle of statutory construction provides that a court will uphold
congressional action as long as the court can perceive some appropriate constitutional basis
for that action, regardless of whether that reason in fact underlies the legislative decision.
See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 104-07 (1971); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641,
653 (1966); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 611-12 (1960); Woods v. Miller Co., 333 U.S.
138, 144 (1948); see also Equal Pay Act, supra note 11, at 679-81.
3 See Tribe, supra note 2, at 1077, 1096-99.
" See id. at 1097.
31 H. RE. No. 309, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1963), reprinted in (1963] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. Naws 687, 688.
3 See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (statutory distinction as to
benefits accorded the spouses of male and female members of the armed services violates
equal protection clause).
See text accompanying notes 19-22 supra.
nId.
Unlike the commerce clause, section one of the fourteenth amendment expressly cur-
tails the authority and sovereignty of a state. See note 21 supra.
-" See note 29 supra.
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challenging the state's sovereignty is an individual liberty protected by the
fourteenth amendment. Unlike the commerce clause, the language of the
fourteenth amendment expressly subordinates the state's interest in sover-
eignty to the individual liberties secured by that amendment." In Ex parte
Virginia,4' the Supreme Court clearly indicated the extent of Congress'
power to enforce the equal protection clause against the states by stating
that
[t]he prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment are directed to
the States, and they are to a degree restrictions of State power. It
is these which Congress is empowered to enforce, and to enforce
against State action, however put forth, whether that action be
executive, legislative, or judicial. Such enforcement is no invasion
of State sovereignty.2
Only four days after the League of Cities decision, the Court reaffirmed
this analysis in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer. 43 The Fitzpatrick Court unanimously
held that a state was liable for discriminating among employees on the
basis of sex under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19644" without consid-
ering whether those employees furthered a traditional governmental func-
tion.45 The fourteenth amendment character of Title VII was dispositive of
11 See note 21 and text accompanying note 38 supra.
At least one Supreme Court decision has recognized, however, that the enforcement
clause of the fourteenth amendment may be limited in some degree by the concept of state
sovereignty. In Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970), Justice Black wrote that the power
granted to Congress under the enforcement clause "was not intended to strip the States of
their power to govern themselves or to convert our national government of enumerated powers
into a central government of unrestrained authority over every inch of the whole Nation."
Id. at 128 (opinion of Black, J.). Justice Black thus believed that the congressional attempt
to lower the voting age in state and local elections challenged by the state of Oregon infringed
the state power to regulate internal elections reserved to the states by the tenth amendment.
Id. at 124-31. Five other justices agreed with Justice Black's position. See id. at 154-213
(opinion by Harlan, J.); and at 293-96 (opinion by Stewart, J.).
One further limitation has been suggested by analogy to the relationship between the
supremacy clause, U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl.2, and the commerce clause. The argument con-
tends that if League of Cities holds that commerce clause legislation may be limited by the
tenth amendment although the supremacy clause binds all states to obey that legislation,
then similar language in the fourteenth amendment directing the states to obey enactments
under that amendment also should be limited by the tenth amendment. See Michelman,
supra note 2, at 1183 n.59. Since the language of the fourteenth amendment was designed to
secure individual liberties rather than enforce federal power, this comparison seems faulty.
41 100 U.S. 339 (1879).
11 Id. at 346.
43 427 U.S. 445, 451-56 (1976).
44 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1970 & Supp. V 1975). Title VT! and the Equal Pay Act have
the common legislative purpose of prohibiting sex discrimination in employment and long
have been considered as complementary statutes. See Usery v. County of Oakland, 81 Lab.
Cas. 47,847, 47,848 (E.D. Mich. 1977), and cases cited therein.
11 427 U.S. at 451-56. Fitzpatrick involved an eleventh amendment challenge to the
authority of federal courts to award money damages in favor of a private individual against
a state government that has violated the anti-discrimination provisions of Title VII. Id. at
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the state sovereignty claim." Because Title VII and the Equal Pay Act are
complementary sex discrimination provisions," with similar constitutional
bases," the Fitzpatrick Court's ratification of the constitutionality of Title
VII also determines the constitutional validity of the equal pay provi-
sions.4"
By upholding the Equal Pay Act as a valid exercise of congressional
power under the fourteenth amendment, the Charleston County court reaf-
firmed the immunity from state sovereignty claims accorded legislation
enacted pursuant to that authority by the Supreme Court in Ex parte
Virginia and Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer. The Fourth Circuit thus clarified a
major uncertainty created by the League of Cities decision." Although
Charleston County School District defines a limitation on the concept of
federalism embodied in the tenth amendment, the concept remains a po-
tent defense in the commerce clause setting and stands as a potential
restriction of other congressional powers.51
C. First Amendment and Public Employee Dismissal*
In Shaw v. Board of Trustees of Frederick Community College,' the
Fourth Circuit examined another of an increasing number of cases involv-
ing teacher dismissals and first amendment freedoms.' In response to two
college professors who alleged that they were discharged for constitution-
ally protected activity, the Fourth Circuit upheld the action of the college.
The court held first that the conduct at issue was not pure speech and thus
was not protected,3 and second, that even assuming that aspects of pure
447-48. No reason exists, however, for distinguishing the concept of state sovereignty pro-
tected under the tenth and eleventh amendments. See Beaird & Ellington, A Commerce
Power Seesaw: Balancing National League of Cities, 11 GA. L. Rav. 35, 66-69 (1976);
Federalism Limitations, supra note 2, at 1151 n.118.
,8 427 U.S. at 456.
See note 44 supra.
' See text accompanying notes 32-37 and 46 supra.
" See Equal Pay Act, supra note 11, at 678. See also Usery v. County of Oakland, 81
Lab. Cas. 47,847 47,848 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
See 426 U.S. at 852 n.17.
51 See generally Note, Toward New Safeguards on Conditional Spending: Implications
of National League of Cities v. Usery, 26 AMaR. U.L. REv. 726 (1977); Federalism Limitations,
supra note 2.
* The Law Review acknowledges the contribution of research by George Huddleston I,
a student at Washington & Lee School of Law.
1 549 F.2d 929 (4th Cir. 1976).
2 See e.g., Williams v. Day, 553 F.2d 1160 (8th Cir. 1977); Watts v. Board of Curators,
495 F.2d 384 (8th Cir. 1974); Gieringer v. Center School Dist. No. 58, 477 F.2d 1164 (8th Cir.
1973); Dean v. Burnett, No. H-75-1087 (D. Md., filed Nov. 23, 1977).
3 549 F.2d at 933.
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speech were present, there was no impermissible motive for the dismissal
of the plaintiffs.' Soon after Shaw was decided, the Supreme Court faced
a similar situation 5 and described a test that arguably would have pro-
duced a better result in Shaw.6 In fact, the Supreme Court's test subse-
quently has been applied by at least one district court in the Fourth
Circuit.,
In Shaw v. Board of Trustees,8 plaintiffs Shaw and Winn' joined a
number of other faculty members in opposing a change in the tenure sys-
tem of the college. The group decided to express their protest by refusing
to participate in commencement exercises' and by not attending a faculty
workshop." Participation in both activities was a mandatory term of em-
ployment.'2 The teachers subsequently received letters from the college
administration stating that their termination was being considered be-
cause of their failure to join in the two required activities.'3
Id. at 934.
See Mount Healthy City School Dist. v. Doyle, 97 S. Ct. 568 (1977).
See text accompanying notes 35-45 infra.
7 Dean v. Burnett, No. H-75-1087 (D. Md., filed Nov. 23, 1977).
8 549 F.2d 929 (4th Cir. 1976).
1 Although Shaw was in fact a tenured professor and Winn held a "continuing appoint-
ment" with the college, these interests of the plaintiffs need not be shown in cases of first
amendment attack. Normally, a liberty or property interest must be shown to invoke due
process limitations on the discretion of a governmental employer to dismiss employees. Board
of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). However, in no circumstance may the state impose
arbitrary or unreasonable conditions on continued employment. See Board of Regents v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968); Keyishian v.
Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967). This limitation proscribes employee dismissals based
upon the employee's exercise of otherwise constitutionally protected rights, such as member-
ship in political organizations, Orr v. Thorpe, 427 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1970), or speaking out
on issues of public concern. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968). Thus an
aggrieved employee need demonstrate no liberty or property interest in order to protect his
exercise of constitutional right. See also, French, Unconstitutional Conditions: An Analysis,
50 GEO. L.J. 234 (1961); Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HARv. L. Rav. 1439 (1960);
Note, Constitutional Rights of Public Employees: Progress Towards Protection, 49 N.C.L.
REV. 302 (1971); Comment, Another Look At Unconstitutional Conditions, 117 U. PA. L. REV.
144 (1968).
"1 The dissident faculty members voted to attend commencement, but not to march in
the procession wearing academic regalia and not to sit in the designated section of the
auditorium. 549 F.2d at 931. In fact they did attend the commencement, plainly identified
by name tags, and sat with a majority of the faculty in one section, though not in the
designated area. Id. at 936 (Butzner, J., dissenting).
11 At a meeting of twenty-one faculty members held prior to either the workshop or
commencement, the teachers, including Winn and Shaw, resolved that they would "not meet
any professional obligations until the Board grants negotiating rights." Id. at 931. Pursuant
to this resolution, the faculty group boycotted the workshop and the commencement. The
group confined its protest to these two functions and clearly announced that its collective
action was taken solely to protest the college policy. Id. at 935 (Butzner, J., dissenting).
12 Section 3.203.2c of the Frederick Community College Policy Manual stated:
"Attendance and participation shall be required at Commencement, scheduled staff meet-
ings, scheduled workshops, and other scheduled activities." 549 F.2d at 931, n.3.
,1 Id. at 931.
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After receipt of this letter, negotiations began between the administra-
tion and the threatened teachers. The result of this process was an agree-
ment that if the teachers would sign a letter acknowledging that they had
been in "neglect of professional duties," then the termination proceedings
would be dismissed. 4 The plaintiffs Shaw and Winn failed to comply ade-
quately with either this compromise,'" or another,'" and eventually were
dismissed. Thereafter they brought suit under section 1983,17 contending
that they could not be discharged for violating the terms of their employ-
ment because the violations alleged were part of a protest protected by the
first amendment.'8
In examining the actions of the plaintiffs, the Fourth Circuit first stated
the established principle that Shaw and Winn "did not surrender those
[first amendment] rights [of association and expression] by virtue of
accepting employment in a public education institution,"' and thus that
the plaintiffs could not be prohibited from disagreeing with the tenure
change or from stating their disagreement.2" The court went on to say,
however, that a college reasonably could expect a teacher to follow instruc-
tions and that a teacher could not "immunize himself against loss of posi-
tion simply because his non-cooperation and aggressive conduct are ver-
balized."'
" The dissident teachers were allowed to sign a form letter containing the following
conditions: that they "acknowledged that the activities engaged in were a neglect of profes-
sional duties; promised not to participate in such activities in the future; and agreed that
the Policy Manual was the basis upon which the college would be run." Id. at 931.
"1 The teachers were given a deadline by which to deliver their letters to the administra-
tion. Although the deadline was June 30, a Saturday, Shaw and Winn did not hand in their
letters until July 2, the following Monday. Nevertheless the college declined to reinstate Shaw
and Winn. Id. at 936 (Butzner, J., dissenting).
"1 Following hearings before the Board of Trustees, in August the school offered Shaw
and Winn one year employment contracts, on the proviso that the work be performed off
campus. Shaw and Winn refused this offer and were terminated. Id. at 932.
11 Section 1983 provides that
Every person who under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any state or territory, subjects oi causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
" 549 F.2d at 932.
" Id. In stating that plaintiffs did not surrender their rights by accepting employment,
the Fourth Circuit relied on Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972), and Keyishian v.
Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967). See note 9 supra.
549 F.2d at 932.
2 Id. The Fourth Circuit relied on its prior decision of Chitwood v. Feaster, 468 F.2d 359
(4th Cir. 1972). In Chitwood the court denied summary judgment against teachers who
asserted that their anti-war and protest activities, and statements critical of the college, were
the cause of their dismissals. The Fourth Circuit remanded for a determination of whether
the protected conduct was the cause of the termination, stating that the "force of the claims
that protected speech occasioned the. discharges would be far less shadowy if we knew how
many other untenured teachers had engaged in comparable speech and how many of them
had their contracts terminated." Id. at 361. Compare this approach with the investigation of
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The Fourth Circuit drew a sharp distinction between protected speech
and unprotected conduct and held that the plaintiffs' actions fell exclu-
sively into the latter category. Distinguishing other cases involving speech
in the educational community as involving conduct "closely akin to pure
speech,"2 the court held that the "conduct of Shaw and Winn went beyond
pure speech into the realm of breach of express obligation of their employ-
ment.'" 2 The Fourth Circuit indicated that such conduct was not protected
by the first amendment, and the Board of Trustees had the authority to
discharge the teachers for non-participation in the workshop and the
commencement exercises. 24 Thus the court held that while teachers could
oppose the tenure policy, and express that opposition, the conduct of boy-
cotting required college activities was not sufficiently speech-related to
command constitutional protection.
Relying on Pickering v. Board of Education,2 5 the dissent argued that
more was involved in determining the extent of first amendment protection
than the simple speech/nonspeech categorization by the majority. In
Pickering, the Supreme Court held that a teacher's first amendment rights
were not absolute, but that exercise of such rights could be restricted only
when it interfered with performance of classroom duties or with the regular
operation of the school.26 The Shaw dissent contended that the majority
should have inquired into the actual impact of the teacher's behavior on
the college, 27 and only if the activity disturbed the normal operation of the
school should Shaw and Winn not enjoy the protection of the first amend-
ment. Raising a number of facts to demonstrate the good faith and moder-
ation of the plaintiffs,2 the dissent included the fact that the faculty mem-
the majority in Shaw, 549 F.2d at 933-34, and the dissent, 549 F.2d at 934-35 (Butzner, J.,
dissenting). See text accompanying notes 41-45 infra.
2 549 F.2d at 933. The cases the Fourth Circuit distinguished were Tinker v. Des Moines
School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968); and
Starsky v. Williams, 353 F. Supp. 900 (D. Ariz. 1972).
2 549 F.2d at 933.
24 Id.
- 391 U.S. 563 (1968). In Pickering, a teacher was discharged f6r sending a letter critical
of the school board to a local newspaper. Against the teacher's contention of first and four-
teenth amendment protection, the board contended that the interests of the school system
overrode the teacher's first amendment rights. The Supreme Court held that the teacher's
interest as a citizen in making public comment must be weighed against the interest of the
state in promoting the efficiency of public services. The test was whether the teacher's actions
have "either impeded the teacher's proper performance of his daily duties in the classroom
or . . .have interfered with the regular operation of the schools generally." 391 U.S. at 572-
73. Only in those circumstances would the interest of the state be sufficient to restrict the
protected speech of the teacher.
21 Id. at 572-73; see note 25 supra.
27 549 F.2d at 935 (Butzner, J., dissenting).
21 Examining the record, the dissent pointed out that Shaw and Winn had otherwise
exemplary records, were well-qualified, clearly announced the purpose of their protest ac-
tions, fully performed all duties other than the two functions, played moderating roles within
the faculty group, and acted in good faith on the advice of counsel. In addition, the dissent
sought to demonstrate the triviality of the offenses committed and the minimal impact of
the conduct on the operation of the college. Id. at 935-36 (Butzner, J., dissenting).
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bers had announced that their nonparticipation in the events was solely
to protest the tenure policy." The dissent concluded on this issue that "the
right of Shaw and Winn to protest the college's employment policies was
protected by the first amendment. They did not forfeit this protection, for
their protest neither impaired their own work nor interfered with the opera-
tion of the school.
30
After determining that the actions of the plaintiffs were not constitu-
tionally protected, the majority went on to rest its decision upholding the
discharges on a second ground, motive. Even assuming the case did con-
tain aspects of pure speech, the court could find no impermissible motiva-
tion for the termination decision by the Board of Trustees.3 ' The court
examined the facts for the "real motivation '32 and concluded that the acts
of the college administration3 indicated that the assigned reasons of non-
participation in required functions were not simply pretexts for the school
to dismiss those who disagreed with its policies. Rather, the terminations
were held to be a legitimate reaction to violations of the terms of employ-
ment, not influenced by any impermissible motivation.
3
By phrasing its analysis in terms of the "real" motivation, however, the
Fourth Circuit oversimplified the task before it and distorted its result.
The difficulty obscured by the court's inquiry is that decisions often are
not based on a single reason, but on several reasons. 5 If a teacher is dis-
charged expressly because he engaged in protected speech, there is no
trouble discerning "the real motivation." Similarly, if a teacher is dis-
charged after engaging in protected speech, but the basis asserted for the
termination consists of frivolous contentions, there is no trouble determin-
Id. at 936.
3 Id.
31 Id. at 933. The majority also rejected a claim by the plaintiffs that they had been
denied equal protection in their discharge because they were forced to adhere to a June 30
deadline while other members of the dissident group were allowed to wait until August before
submitting the letter of apology. See notes 14-15 supra. The Fourth Circuit upheld the district
court's determination that a rational basis existed for the distinction, in that the contracts
of Shaw and Winn began on July 1, while those of the other teachers did not. Id. at 934. The
dissent contended, however, that there was not a rational relation between the classification
and the treatment received. Because Shaw was tenured and Winn held a continuing appoint-
ment, the dissent contended that the June 30 deadline was irrelevant to either the plaintiffs'
right to employment or the college's authority to dismiss them. Id. at 936-37 (Butzner, J.,
dissenting).
1 Id. at 933.
3 The majority stated that the acts of the college reflected an administration "willing
to bend over backward to avoid having to discharge anyone, but unwilling to acknowledge
the right of its teachers to disregard the rules with impunity." Id. at 933. The court recited
the following facts: the president sought explanations and personal conferences with all the
teachers involved; he negotiated with the group's attorney and was willing to accept a form
letter or a letter of a teacher's own composition; and the Board offered one-year contracts of
employment even after the deadline had passed. Id. at 933-34.
3, Id. at 934.
35 See, e.g., Gieringer v. Center School Dist. No. 58, 477 F.2d at 1164 (8th Cir. 1973);
Cook County College Teachers Union v. Byrd, 456 F.2d 882, 889 (7th Cir. 1972).
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ing the "real" motivation.36 When a teacher has engaged in a number of
reprehensible actions and in protected speech," however, the determina-
tion becomes considerably more difficult. The better analysis is to ask how
important a role the impermissible motivation played in the termination
decision."
The Supreme Court faced a similar combination of reprehensible ac-
tions and protected speech recently in Mount Healthy City School District
v. Doyle.3" In that case the Court stated that once the employee-teacher
demonstrated that protected conduct was a motivating factor in the deci-
sion to discharge, the burden rested on the school board to show that the
teacher would have been terminated even absent the protected conduct."
This standard requires that the impermissible motivation play a dominant
role, rather than simply a partial role, in the decision to discharge. If the
impermissible motivation is shown to satisfy the Mount Healthy test, it
clearly would satisfy the more ambiguous "real motivation" test.
The difference resulting from the methodology of these two approaches
is illustrated by the dissent in Shaw.4 Although the dissent did not state
a rule comparable to the one later announced in Mount Healthy, it made
much the same investigation that the Mount Healthy standard would
demand. Judge Butzner, writing the dissenting opinion, examined prior
instances of teachers committing the same violations as Shaw and Winn
and compared the punishments received. The record showed that non-
protesting faculty members who did not attend other graduations or work-
shops were not dismissed, but only reprimanded or docked in pay.,' While
3 See, e.g., Johnson v. Branch, 364 F.2d 177 (4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1003
(1967).
3 See, e.g., Mount Healthy City School Dist. v. Doyle, 97 S. Ct. 568 (1977).
33 See Mount Healthy City School Dist. v. Doyle, 97 S. Ct. 568 (1977). Prior to the Mount
Healthy decision, courts had recognized the difficulty of numerous motivations for a dis-
charge decision, but were left with the question of how stringently to protect first amendment
activity. That is, once it is recognized that an impermissible motivation may play only a
partial role in the decision, the issue becomes whether the decision should be invalidated if
the bad motive played any role in it or only if the bad motive formed the dominant reason
for dismissal. Compare Mabey v. Reagan, 537 F.2d 1936 (9th Cir. 1976) (partial factor) with
Chitwood v. Feaster, 468 F.2d 359, 360 (4th Cir. 1972) ("the cause of the termination") and
Williams v. Day, 412 F. Supp. 336, 340 n.1 (E.D. Ark. 1976), aff'd 553 F.2d 1160 (8th Cir.
1977) ("the actual reason"). The Supreme Court in Mount Healthy resolved this question by
requiring a showing that the dismissal would not have taken place absent the impermissible
motivation. See text accompanying notes 39-40 infra.
97 S. Ct. 568 (1977).
, Justice Rehnquist, writing for a unanimous Court, stated that:
A rule of causation which focuses solely on whether protected conduct played a
part, 'substantial' or otherwise, in a decision not to rehire, could place an employee
in a better position as a result of the exercise of the constitutionally protected
conduct than he would have occupied had he done nothing.. . .The constitutional
principle at stake is sufficiently vindicated if such an employee is placed in no worse
a position than if he had not engaged in the conduct.
97 S. Ct. at 575.
549 F.2d at 934 (Butzner, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 934-35.
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